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The paper presents labor productivities in the member countries of Euroland.
The result is that there is quite a divergence in labor productivities (per head) in
the European Monetary Union. The Netherlands and Italy reach 85 percent of
the West German level, Spain 62 and Portugal 35. This implies that labor costs
have to be differentiated substantially between the euro countries. Labor costs
relative to the West German level are also calculated. The paper analyzes the
implication of diverging labor productivities for wage policy and for the financing
of the social security systems in the European Monetary Union.
J.E.L.-Klassifikation: J24, H55, F15, F361. To what extent labor costs have to adjust in the European Monetary Union can be
discussed under two different headings. First, it is argued that in a monetary union
the exchange rate is no longer available to serve as a cushion if economic develop-
ment between different countries of a currency union diverges, i.e. if economic
growth of one country is much weaker than in other countries or if a country experi-
ences an asymmetric shock. Since in Europe transfrontier mobility of labor is rather
limited and since transfer payments between sovereign nation states are not desir-
able, labor costs, i.e. the wage rate and the social security costs for firms, has to take
over the role of the exchange rate as a shock absorber (Siebert 1998a). Second, the
question is asked what the increased transparency of prices and costs in a monetary
union means for wage setting in the individual countries. It is this second question
which is discussed in the following sections.
Transparency of prices and labor costs
2. In a monetary union, trading costs are reduced and market segmentations dis-
appear. As a stylized fact, Jevon's law of one price will prevail. Assuming for simplic-
ity that there is one good only in the monetary union, the ratio of nominal wage costs
to marginal labor productivities must be equal across countries. For the simple two-
country case we have
"tt
where FA and FA denote the marginal labor productivities, I and I* are nominal labor
costs and p is the national price level.
* I appreciate comments from Jorg Dopke.— 2 —
Equation (1) requires that marginal labor costs of production are equal between
countries with 1/FA representing the marginal input requirement per unit of output
and l/FA denoting the marginal input requirement evaluated at the input price, i.e.
marginal costs.
3. Of course, the equality of marginal labor costs is given if labor productivities and
labor costs are equal in the member countries. If labor productivities differ, national
labor costs must differ as well. Thus, a country can compensate a lower labor pro-
ductivity if its labor costs are proportionally lower.
This equilibrium condition for the good market translates into an equilibrium condition
of the labor market. An equilibrium in the labor markets of the monetary union will be
reached when labor costs are borne by the productivities in the member countries
and when at the same time national labor productivities are not distorted by large
layoffs in the different countries but reflect the full employment labor productivities.
To put it differently: Diverging national labor productivities in the currency union are
consistent with full employment if national labor productivities are not exceeded by
national labor costs, i.e. if
FA > I / p and FA > I * /p. (2)
Divergence of labor productivities
4. Unfortunately, we cannot calculate marginal national labor productivities but must
use average labor productivities instead.
1 In the past, average national labor produc-
tivities could not be reliably calculated because nominal exchange rates or pur-
chasing power parities had to be used in order to do the comparison. The euro as a
single currency permits to compare the labor productivities of the different countries.
Before the formal beginning of monetary union, the central rates which will-serve as
1 On a method to calculate marginal labor productivities compare Sachverstandigenrat
(1997), Appendix V, E, p. 264 ff.-3-
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aNominal GDP per person employed.
Source: OECD and own calculations.
conversion factors of national currencies can be used. In Figure 1, the labor produc-
tivities of EMU members for 1997 are reported. Labor productivity is defined as the
nominal GDP in ECU, calculated with the central rate, per head of total employ-
ment.
2 West Germany is set equal to 100. The differences in labor productivity per
head of total employment in the countries of Euroland are quite impressive. Belgium
reaches a similar level as West Germany, France (95,3 percent) and Austria (90,9
percent) have a somewhat lower labor productivity. The other countries differ con-
siderably from the West German level, with the Netherlands at 85,4 percent, Italy at
85,3 percent and Ireland at 69,5 percent. Spain (62,0 percent) and Portugal (34,5
percent) are quite apart from the others. East Germany reaches 60 percent of the
West German level. Using the actual central rate for the British Pound, the UK is at
71,7 percent (Table 1).
2 Calculating labor productivities for 1997 allows us to use nominal GDP and nominal com-
pensation. Other approaches relating to a time span of several years may use real GDP
































































aNominal GDP per person engaged (total employment) (thousand ECU, calculated with the actual central rate). —
 bGross compensation of
employees (wage and salary earners) per employee (wage and salary earner) (thousand ECU, calculated with the actual central rate). —
cStandardized, OECD; for East and West Germany: own calculations.
Source: OECD Quarterly National Accounts 1998; OECD Main Economic Indicators 1998 and own calculations and estimates.-5-
Do national labor costs correspond to national productivities?
5. Diverging labor productivities require that national labor costs differ as well. Calcu-
lating national labor costs per head as cross compensation of all employees (wage
and salary earners) per head of employee we see that national labor costs in the
countries of the European Monetary Union also differ.
In Figure 2 the labor productivities and labor costs levels of the member countries of
the European Union as well of the United Kingdom are presented in percent of the
West German productivity level and the West German labor cost level for 1997. The
45°-line takes West Germany as a reference point. This line represents the unit labor
costs of western Germany; it should not be misinterpreted as a norm since after all
Germany has a high unemployment rate.
Figure 2 — Labor productivities and labor costs in Euroland (in percent of West
Germany)
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Countries above the 45°-line have higher unit labor costs than western Germany, for
instance, Belgium, France and East Germany. Countries below the 45°-line have
lower unit labor costs. Taking the diagram at face value, countries above the 45°-line
like Belgium and Finland should have more problems in their labor markets.
6. If instead of the statistically observed productivities and labor costs we are inter-
ested in the question which loci are consistent with full employment, two corrections
have to be made in Figure 2:
-— First, the observed points of individual countries reflect a too high labor productiv-
ity if the unemployment rate is high. If more people would be integrated into the
labor market, the labor productivity would be correspondingly lower. Therefore,
we would have to correct for the so-called lay-off productivity. For instance, in the
case of West Germany, the full employment labor productivity would be definitely
lower. Thus, the full employment point in Figure 2 would move to the left.
— Second, we have to examine whether the observed national labor costs are too
high relative to the full employment labor productivity. Taking the case of West
Germany and using a rough calculation, a twelve percent lower level of labor
costs would allow to halve the unemployment rate (Siebert 1998).
3 Thus, the
point for the labor costs consistent with full employment would be correspondingly
lower by 12 percent.
4
3 A wage elasticity of 0.5 and a stable price level are assumed.
4 Note that in equation (1) full employment is assumed. If we split up the full employment
labor supply A
F in actually employed E and unemployed U, we have
pFA(E + U) = 1.
With an analogous equation for the second country
it follows, assuming separability of productivity,
I FA(U)_ I* Fl(U)
P =FA(E) FA(E) FA(E)
Thus, a constant relation between the nominal labor costs and productivity can no longer
be derived if national unemployment rates differ.-7-
As a consequence, countries which show a relatively high unemployment rate would
move to the left and downward with their full employment points. A line defining the
full employment situation would therefore be on a lower level than the 45°-line.
Countries with a high unemployment rate like Spain (20,8 percent), France (12,4
percent), Italy (12,1 percent) and Germany (9,7 percent) would have to be placed
according lower.
7. The above analysis can only be a first approach to analyze European labor mar-
kets. The data leave a great deal to be desired. One aspect already mentioned is
that labor productivities have to be corrected for the differences in the unemployment
rates. Another aspect is that the data are preliminary. Moreover, the collection and
calculation of the data differs between countries. For instance, Italy adds a correction
factor for the shadow economy, so that nominal GDP and, consequentially, labor
productivity may be overestimated relative to other countries. The extent of part time
work differs considerably between countries, so that ideally productivity and labor
costs should be calculated per hour. Here data are even more sketchy. Countries
with an overproportionally high part time employment tend to show a lower labor pro-
ductivity per head (like the Netherlands). Moreover, productivity is related to total
employment, labor costs are related to salary and wage earners the difference being
self-employed business men. Statistical methods of calculation of self-employed
business men influence the comparability of data. There are other differences in the
statistical calculation of the data. Finally, the data only present a snap-shot of the
year 1997. Thus, differences in the business cycle situation among countries will
influence the comparison since labor productivity in most countries varies pro-
cyclically.
Implications for wage policy and for financing the social security systems
8. In spite of these concerns the empirical results allow the following conclusions for
wage policy.-8-
— Since labor productivities diverge considerably between the countries of the
European Monetary Union, labor costs must be differentiated between the
member states of the monetary union since national labor costs must be borne by
national productivities. Otherwise, unemployment will result. Moreover, we know
from empirical studies that convergence takes a long time.
— Wage policy in the individual countries should orient itself at the national labor
productivities. Wage harmonization in the European Monetary Union cannot be
aimed at. People must understand that the level of national wages must reflect
the differences in national labor productivities.
— Institutionally, wage formation cannot be europeanized, even if people compare
their wage in one single currency and even if political demands of ,,the same
wage for the same type of work" are likely to be articulated. Europeanizing of
wage formation would definitely increase the unemployment rate in the European
countries. What is needed is a decentralization of wage formation, shifting wage
formation from the economy wide or sector level to the regional and to the firm's
level. Wage formation, especially in the major countries of the continent, should
follow more closely the market process.
The europeanization of employment policies cannot undo the differences in labor
productivities. Accepting the given fact of diverging labor productivities between the
member countries of the monetary union, the idea of europeanizing employment
policies is a misguided approach to European integration.
9. Labor costs also include the contributions to the security systems paid by the
firms. These labor costs, too, have to be borne by the national productivities. The
divergence in labor productivities makes clear that the costs of social security
systems in the different countries also must be different. This means that social
security benefits cannot be harmonized. With such a divergence of national produc-
tivities a social union cannot be realized and the europeanization of social policy is to
be avoided. The territorial principle of social insurance in Europe according to which
benefits can only be obtained from the system to which contributions have been paid
is quite appropriate.-9-
10. Some have the idea that wage competition in Euroland will be a spiral downward.
This idea is wrong. As soon as the national wage level corresponds to the national
full employment labor productivity, wages will no longer have to be adjusted down-
ward. Firms will compete for qualified labor and this will insure that wages will not fall
short of the national full employment threshold of labor productivity.-10-
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